A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities, including legal activities and civic, charitable, educational, religious, social, financial, fiduciary and governmental activities, and may speak, write, lecture and teach on legal and non-legal issues. However, a judge should not engage in extrajudicial activities that violate the dignity of the judicial function, interfere with the exercise of judicial functions, impair the impartiality of the judge, result in frequent disqualification or violate the restrictions listed below. See Black`s Law Dictionary 1537 (9th ed. 2009) (definition of “super stare decisis” as “the theory that courts must follow previous court decisions without examining whether those decisions were correct”). See also Paulsen, note 20 above, at 1538 n.8 (“The essence of doctrine. is compliance with previous decisions, in subsequent cases. even if, in the subsequent case, the tribunal would otherwise be prepared to say, on the basis of other interpretative criteria, that the legal interpretation of the earlier decision is erroneous. »). A court that follows a previous decision because it was correctly decided does not adhere to the decision of the gaze; This is only a confirmation of the previous one. Fallon, loc. cit. 20, p.

570 (“If a court considers that a previous decision is correct, it may confirm that decision on the merits without reference to stare decisis.”). Stare decisis is the court`s policy of sticking to precedents; The term is just an abbreviation of stare decisis and non quieta movere – “to stand and stick to decisions and not to disturb what is regulated”. Consider the word “decisis.” The word means, literally and legally, the decision. According to the doctrine of stare decisis, a case is important only for what it decides – for the “what”, not for the “why” and not for the “how”. For the previous ones, the stare decisis is important only for the decision, for the detailed legal consequence after a detailed fact. [26] Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921) The doctrine of binding precedent or stare decisis is fundamental to the English legal system. Among the peculiarities of the English legal system are the following: although the Supreme Court has shown less reluctance to override its decisions on constitutional issues than its decisions on legal issues, the Court has nevertheless held that there must be a special justification – or at least “strong reasons” – that goes beyond rejecting the reasoning of an earlier decision, to override constitutional precedents. Therefore, in deciding whether to override a precedent for the interpretation of the Constitution, the Court has in the past considered several “prudential and pragmatic” factors aimed at promoting the rule of law while offsetting the costs and benefits to society when a previous interest is confirmed or reversed: 585 U.S.

___, No. 16-1466, Slip op. to 34-35 (2018). In a 2009 decision, Justice Scalia, speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court, also referred to the “seniority” of a precedent (i.e., the time since his decision) as a factor to be considered. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 791-97 (2009) (on Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S.

625 (1986)). But when the janus court presented a list of precedent-setting factors, it did not discuss this factor, which is based on the idea that “respect for previous decisions increases rather than decreases with their seniority as society adapts to its existence and the surrounding law is based on its validity.” South Carolina vs. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., different). As Colin Starger pointed out, the contemporary rule of stare decisis, derived from seminal dissent from Brandeis to Burnet, then split into strong and weak notions, following the disagreement between Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall in Payne v. Tennessee (1991). [39] The strong conception requires a “special justification” to prevail over the contested precedent, which goes beyond the fact that the precedent was “poorly decided,” while the weak conception states that a precedent can be overturned if it suffers from “bad reasoning.” [39] And as noted above, judges often rely on precedents, both explicitly by invoking precedents in their opinions,167 and implicitly by accepting principles established by precedents, such as the power of judicial review.168 A review of Supreme Court decisions that apply these factors suggests that it is difficult to predict when the Court will overturn a previous decision. This uncertainty stems in part from the fact that the Court has not produced an exhaustive list of the factors on the basis of which it determines whether a decision should be set aside or how it can be weighed up. The recent jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment is a good example. In a Fourth Amendment case in 1973, the court established a rather categorical rule that allows searches of people who have been lawfully arrested. This rule may have been justifiable when it was enacted, but technological changes ultimately made it imperfect.

Today, most people carry much of their lives in their smartphones, which makes personal searches very intrusive. In response to this development, a number of lower courts interpreted the 1973 decision narrowly, so that it did not apply to smartphones. These decisions were highly controversial, and there was a strong argument that they violated the best reading of an openly categorical precedent. But when the Supreme Court in 2014 in Riley v. California criticized the decisions that had “mechanically” adhered to the 1973 case and praised the lower courts, which had stretched case law to update them. (1) A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain his professional competence and shall not be influenced by the political interests of the parties, public shouting or fear of criticism. (5) Exercise of rights. A judge should not practise as a lawyer and should not serve as a lawyer for a family member in a forum. However, a judge may take legal action and, without compensation, provide legal advice to a member of the judge`s family and draft or revise documents for that member.

The table does not include cases where the Court of Justice has annulled an earlier procedural decision (e.g. the annulment of a previously adopted suspension). See, for example, Paramount Publix Corp. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 293 United States 528 (1934) (Repeal of an earlier order rejecting the certiorari). (4) A judge should grant any person who has a legal interest in a proceeding and his or her lawyer the full right to be heard in accordance with the law. Unless otherwise stated below, a judge should not initiate, authorize or contemplate unilateral communications or consider other communications about a pending or imminent case that occur outside the presence of the parties or their counsel. When a judge receives an unauthorised unilateral communication affecting the content of a case, he or she should immediately inform the parties of the subject-matter of the communication and give them the opportunity to comment upon request. A judge can: But if the Supreme Court`s jurisprudence is ambiguous in a relevant way, then a narrowing is often legitimate, even if it means not adhering to the best available reading of the precedent.

After all, the High Court is not the only source of law relevant to the lower courts. When it comes to unclear jurisprudence, lower courts often have the right to sin on the side of their own fundamental opinions on the constitutional or other law in question. Indeed, the Supreme Court`s decision to set unclear precedents can be understood as a kind of delegation to subordinate courts, allowing them to make adjustments in light of their own different knowledge and opinions.